This article focuses on the role of different conceptions of parliamentarism in the EU's political system. First it addresses the ways in which the two concepts of parliamentarism that usually stand as alternatives to each other, parliamentarism as control of the executive and parliamentarism of a separation of powers -type, entered the Union's political system. How does the simultaneous presence of the two models function and what kinds of challenges and tensions does it create? The article also assesses, which future institutional solutions and choices can be considered decisive with respect to the more long-term consolidation of the EU's political system as parliamentarism of the first or second type.
Then the third concept of parliamentarism as politics by means of speaking will be studied with respect to its impact and significance in the EU's system. As this concept is broader than the two first ones, and encompasses a culture of political power rather than relations between political institutions, it does not collide with the first ones. But it can be seen to clash with some other dominant characteristics of the EU's political culture stemming from the Union's intergovernmental features, namely those of diplomatic negotiations and secrecy.
Parliamentarism as control of the executive Accountability of the government to the parliament is the key characteristic of a parliamentary government and the main difference with respect to a presidential one. According to Arend
Lijphart (Lijphart 1999, 117) this accountability means that the head of government with his or her cabinet are responsible to the legislature in the sense that they are dependent on the legislature's confidence and can be dismissed from office by a legislative vote of no confidence or censure. The power to elect the cabinet usually forms a part of the parliament's role in a parliamentary government.
The right of the European Parliament to censure the Commission has formed a part of the core principles of the EU's political system ever since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The initial formulation of parliamentary accountability in the ECSC treaty reflected an aspiration to enable the European institutions to adopt a sufficient independence from the Member States (Gerbet 1989, 46) . The functions of the High Authority (later the Commission) resembled those of a political executive albeit limited to a narrow field of substance.
The High Authority was to be scrutinised by the Parliamentary Assembly through a procedure that was still linked with the approval of the annual report of the former. hybrid type of system become obvious when it comes to the true meaning of the EP's power to elect both the Commission and its President.
Here the non-partisan character of the Commission forms the key factor behind the weak materialisation of the parliamentary control both when it comes to the election of the Commission and censuring it.
Concerning its composition the Commission represents a hybrid of a parliamentary government and a presidential one. In the latter case the members of government depend on the trust of the President. This hybrid form characterises the EU's political system at large and it has been argued that, in fact, instead of a parliamentary democracy a US type of pluralist model of democracy proves itself more applicable to the EU's supranational context and character (Coultrap 1999; see also Dann 2003 and Proksch & Slapin 2010) . At least the current form of the EU level political parties and the working mechanisms of the EP can be seen to have followed this path rather than the one of parliamentary accountability.
Currently the two models of government come together in the job description of the Commission conditions of parliamentarism of a separation -of-powers -system is in current circumstances in the deficient popular anchoring of the government. A president elected by the people is a key characteristic of the separation -of -powers -system and provides proper legitimacy to an executive that is not accountable to the parliament (Lijphart 1999, 17; Siaroff 2003, 288) . The question of a direct election of the Commission President has been widely discussed in the EU recently, and shall be perceived against this background. 5 This step would complete the EU's governance as predominantly a separation-of-powers -system and would thus require a reconsideration of the current mechanisms of parliamentary accountability such as the vote of approval of the Commission and the possibility of a vote of no-confidence.
In its general meaning as power of bodies elected by the people, parliamentarism in the EU has recently encompassed firm efforts to strengthen the role of national parliaments at the EU level.
Being outside the blueprints of both of the two models of parliamentarism discussed afore, the strengthened role of national parliaments is rather presented as a sui generis solution which could, as a less controversial model, help to decrease the EU's lack of democratic legitimacy in the short term.
The EU level empowering of national parliaments has, however, faced difficulties partly due to its weak incompatibility with any of the two leading models of parliamentarism represented by the EU's political system. First, any type of parliamentary control exerted by national parliaments at the EU level can be argued to mix up relations of power and accountability between the two layers of the EU's political system. The new role introduced by the Lisbon treaty, where national parliaments are mandated to control compliance with subsidiarity principle, already faced this criticism and made the 'red-card option', i.e. the possibility to veto against legislative initiatives incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity, a no go to most Member States.
Ideas concerning a further EU-level institutionalisation of the role of national parliaments have, when emerged, met with corresponding criticism. 6 Recently, the idea has come powerfully afore in the context of the economic and financial crisis as a means of improving the democratic legitimacy of the EU's strengthened competence in economic and fiscal policy. Various forms of cooperation between the EP and the national parliaments have been proposed with the most far-reaching suggestions comprising the establishment of a specific chamber to the EP representing national parliaments (Piris 2011, xx) . Any steps to this direction would require a careful consideration of the political and institutional differences taking place between national parliaments as collective actors of their own, apart from national governments. The national parliaments form a very heterogeneous group reflecting differences between national political systems and in their roles therein. Most of them have difficulties in adopting such a role outside the national parliamentary framework which a further institutionalisation of their role at the EU level would require.
Parliamentarism as deliberation and debate
The third concept of parliamentarism reflected in the EU's political system goes back to the historical understanding of the concept as deliberation and debate. This conception of parliamentarism was strongly present in the 19 th century thinking of eg. Walter Bagehot and Max
Weber (Palonen 2008, 82; Palonen 2011, 42-44) . According to Palonen, the parliamentary style of politics operates with the power of deliberation and debate, and it is opposed to politics of sheer force and limits the politics of sheer numbers. Parliamentary speaking means speaking pro et contra in a debate, which provides the key principle of the parliamentary procedure (Palonen 2010, 42) . The essence of parliamentarism ensures that the construction of opposing points of view is not subordinated to a higher truth or common good. On the contrary, the countering of any proposition with an alternative is the driving force behind parliamentary politics.
When approached from this point of view, parliamentarism requires certain working methods from the parliament in order to allow the policy of debate and deliberation to take place. Here, the temporal dimension of parliamentary proceedings is important as parliaments should be permitted enough time for the deliberation of an issue, since this is the main means of reaching a solution. Another method deals -in the spirit of Max Weber -with the executive's need to constantly convince the parliament about its actions through argument and debate. According to
Weberian thinking, the same control should be extended to the state administration concerning its compliance with the parliament's political guidelines.
The EP's development towards a working parliament -and the key role played by its committeeshas affected the ways in which parliamentarism as deliberation and debate is expressed. As the main preparation of the EP's position on legislative issues takes place in the committees -and as this is even the place where the different political standpoints meet through the functions of rapporteurs and shadow-rapporteurs -the plenary is less important as a venue for political deliberation (Mamadouh & Raunio, 2003, 348) . The parliament's regular interaction with the executive -and the duty of the latter to inform and convince the parliament -takes also increasingly place through the committees as these with their chairpersons and rapporteurs are in provide an important forum for political debate in the Union. The practice requires institutions which previously used to operate in a less transparent manner to openly formulate policies and publicly defend them.
Will parliamentarism be perfected?
EU-level parliamentarism is at the crossroads. The hybrid form of parliamentarism combining elements of parliamentarism as control of the executive and parliamentarism of a separation -of powers-type has made the public image of EU level parliament obscure and decreased the democratic legitimacy of the EU's political system. Due to reasons of political acceptability, even contradictory elements of the two main models of parliamentarism have been incorporated into the Union's political governance in a situation where the accomplishment of the EU's democratic governance along with any of them has proved politically difficult. Lack of clarity of the contours of parliamentarism tends to support an underestimate of the role it plays at the EU level.
Currently it seems that the way towards the revision of the Union's democratic governance along the lines of the separation-of powers-system is much shorter as it has become deeply rooted in the EP's procedures and functioning. The decisive step required for the perfectioning of this model also seems politically easier than the essential changes required by the completion of the competing system, i.e. parliamentarism as control of the executive. Whereas the latter would require a transfer into a party government at the EU level -i.e. a party-politisation of the Commission -parliamentarism of a separation-of -powers -type could be strengthened just by making the President of the Commission to be elected by popular vote. This change, which during the past few years has gained increasingly support from various political circles, would imply a decisive move in the competition between the two key models of parliamentarism.
The third model, parliamentarism as deliberation and debate, functions and can be advanced irrespective of the aforementioned end result. The scope of openness and conditions for a broader civil society engagement in political debate are, however, likely to depend on the role and character of political parties. In this respect the two systems of parliamentarism differ essentially and can thus be seen to provide somewhat different conditions for the culture of deliberation and debate.
